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I. INTRODUCTION 
tatutory interpretation is at the forefront of legal academia these 
days; witness the public and controversial debate between Justice 
Scalia and Judge Posner regarding Scalia’s most recent text, Reading 
Law.1 In a nutshell Justice Scalia explained, in as thorough manner as 
possible, why his beloved new textualism is the only correct way to 
approach statutory interpretation.2 Judge Posner disagreed publically 
and pointed out the inconsistencies and flaws with Justice Scalia’s 
approach.3 Justice Scalia accused Posner of lying, and the debate 
turned ugly.4 
Hidden behind this high profile and unprofessional debate is the 
contribution of another legal scholar in this area, Lawrence M. Solan, 
who recently published The Language of Statutes.5 It is unlikely that 
Professor Solan’s text will garner the degree and level of attention that 
Justice Scalia’s text has. Yet, that may be a shame. While Justice 
Scalia and his co-author, Bryan Garner, have added little that is new to 
the intellectual debate and understanding of how people understand 
statutory language, Professor Solan has at least attempted to add 
something original. 
In a relatively short read, only 230 pages excluding endnotes and 
appendices (compare that to Justice Scalia’s 414-page tome), Professor 
Solan approaches statutory interpretation from a novel angle for this 
field, one that melds philosophy, linguistics, and psychology.6 In his 
                                                 
1 See Richard A. Posner, The Spirit Killeth, But the Letter Giveth Life, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 2012 at 18 (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW (2012)). 
2 See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1. 
3 See generally Posner, supra note 1. 
4 Eileen Shim, Yet Another Round of the Scalia-Posner Fight, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Sept. 18, 2012, 3:31 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/107429/scalia-
posner-fight-supreme-court (“Scalia transformed his response from a defensive 
to an offensive one, calling Posner’s accusation that he had an inconsistent 
judicial record, ‘to put it bluntly, a lie.’”); Richard A. Posner, Richard Posner 
Responds to Antonin Scalia’s Accusation of Lying, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 20, 
2012, 1:55 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/107549/richard-posner-
responds-antonin-scalias-accusation-lying. 
5 LAWRENCE SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION (2010). 
6 For other book reviews of Solan’s work, see Samuel Brunson, Book Review: 
Solan’s The Language of Statutes, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 19, 2012, 10:54 
PM), http: //www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/02/book-review-
S
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text, Professor Solan attempts to explain to the legally trained mind 
how people naturally understand and approach language to help 
explain when the interpretation process works and when it does not 
work. He does not propose a new theory, nor, for the most part, 
strongly advocate for an existing theory. Rather, he attempts to show 
the strengths and weaknesses of all the theories in light of philosophy, 
linguistics, and psychology. 
I looked forward to reading this text.7 Professor Solan has, in 
addition to a J.D., a Ph.D. in linguistics.8 With this unusual 
background, he stands in a unique position to help explain to lawyers 
and legal academics how we approach and understand language in a 
way that could help further the interpretation process.9 His last book, 
The Language of Judges,10 was relatively well received.11 In this 
earlier text, Professor Solan used his linguistic expertise to explain 
how judges are not as faithful to the law as they proclaim.12 According 
                                                                                                                   
solans-the-language-of-statutes.html; Brian Christopher Jones, The Language of 
Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation, LAW AND POL. BOOK REV., http: 
//www.lpbr.net/2011/06/language-of-statues-laws-and-their.html; Peter R.A. 
Gray, The Language of Statutes: Laws and their Interpretation, 19 INT’L J. 
SPEECH, LANGUAGE, & L. 135 (2012); Daniel Greenberg, The Language of 
Statutes: Laws and their Interpretation, 33 STATUTE L. REV. 93 (2011). 
7 Indeed, when I was contacted in September by the Editorial Board of the 
University of Massachusetts Law Review to provide an article for the inaugural 
edition of their new general journal, I wondered what I could possibly provide in 
just two months that would add anything of value to statutory interpretation 
discourse. Then I remembered that my dean had sent me an announcement of 
this text and suggested that I review it, given my background in this area. 
Because of his suggestion, the book was sitting unread on my bookshelf. I 
offered to write a book review for the journal. Little did I know how much I 
would benefit from this exercise. 
8 Biography: Lawrence Solan, BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL, https://www.brooklaw
.edu/faculty/directory/facultymember/biography.aspx?id=larry.solan (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2012). 
9 Indeed, “His scholarly works are largely devoted to exploring interdisciplinary 
issues related to law, language and psychology, especially in the areas of 
statutory and contractual interpretation, the attribution of liability and blame, 
and linguistic evidence.” Id. 
10 LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993). 
11 See Craig Hoffman, Commenting on The Language of Judges, 2 J. LEGAL 
WRITING INST. 213 (1996); Terry Gordon, Review: The Language of Judges, 
LINGUIST LIST (Dec. 2, 1993, 2:18 PM), http://linguistlist.org/issues/4/4-1028
.html (book review). 
12 See generally SOLAN, supra note 10. I did not read this text, though I would 
likely have a better understanding of this second text had I done so. 
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to Solan, judges need and desire to offer neutral reasoning for the 
decisions they make, and so they turn to linguistics to provide that 
seemingly neutral path.13 Ultimately, he concludes that judges are less 
than honest in their decision-making processes, using, for example, 
linguistic reasoning to mask subjectiveness.14 I doubt that his 
conclusion will surprise most lawyers today, especially those trained in 
legal realism. 
I also looked forward to his text because statutory interpretation is 
a field that I am passionate about. However, if I am honest, I found 
reading and understanding this text to be a struggle for a number of 
reasons. There is no clear organization or structure in the text neither 
as a whole nor within each chapter. In addition, the text lacked a clear 
introduction. Because it lacked a clear focus and thesis,15 I was never 
certain exactly what Solan was trying to accomplish or whom he was 
trying to reach. It is unclear whether this was a book written for law 
students, legal academics, linguists, judges, or all or a combination of 
these individuals. 
What is clear is that Solan tries to reach two disparate audiences: 
lawyers and linguists.16 On the one hand, he offers linguistic 
explanations to lawyers,17 who likely have no training in linguistics. 
On the other hand, he offers legal explanations to linguists, who likely 
have no legal training. In both cases, his explanations assume a level 
of understanding that neither reader will have. In sum, Professor Solan 
has much to offer both audiences, but he would do well to consider 
writing for them separately in the future. 
Because I found it difficult to understand Solan’s overall purpose 
and thesis and to ascertain the organization of each chapter, I have 
tried to distill his ideas into coherent organizational framework; one 
that might be useful to those of you who would benefit from hearing 
                                                 
13 See id. at 186. 
14 See id. at 185 (“Armed with [an] enormous power, and faced with the 
responsibility of exercising it on a daily basis, judges will, at times, grab at any 
argument that the system accepts as legitimate in order to convince the parties 
and the community at large that the court did what it was supposed to do.”). 
15 For example, even the chapter titles lack coherence. See e.g. infra notes 20, 49, 
185, and accompanying text. While the chapter titles could have provided 
organizational structure, Solan did not use them to this effect. 
16 See, e.g., SOLAN, supra note 5, at 13 (summarizing the problems that the book 
will address). 
17 Id. at 62–66 (providing a “psycholinguistic account” of the problem of 
reconciling definitional meaning and ordinary meaning). 
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about some of his novel contributions but who, perhaps, do not want to 
have to work so hard to understand his points. The Language of 
Statutes is divided into the following chapters: an introduction (which 
is not called an introduction), four chapters on the sources of meaning, 
two chapters on the interpreters, and a conclusion (which is not called 
a conclusion).18 In each, there are pearls of wisdom, which I identify 
for you in a chapter-by-chapter review. Thus, this review summarizes 
what I think are Solan’s key highlights in a fashion as organized and as 
clear as I can provide. Additionally, I offer comments in both the text 
and footnotes when I disagree with Solan’s conclusions or believe a 
more nuanced approach may be appropriate. 
II. ON READING THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES 
A. Laws and Judges 
While there is no true introduction, chapter one19 comes close. In 
it, Solan proclaims, “This book is about the relationship between 
lawmakers and judges. More specifically, it is about how judges judge 
disputes about laws.”20 He notes that, because law developed though 
the common law process, judges are used to playing the leading role in 
laws’ formation.21 With the proliferation of statutes, a debate has 
arisen in legal circles about the appropriate role for judges: some 
believe that judges should simply apply statutes according to their 
plain meaning, while others believe that judges should be a partner in 
the interpretive process.22 Solan pushes aside the question of whether 
judges should play an active role in interpretation and concludes, 
                                                 
18 The chapter titles, along with the subsection titles of this article, are as follows: 
(1) Laws and Judges, at 1; (2) Why We Need to Interpret Statutes, at 16; (3) 
Definitions, Ordinary Meaning, and Respect for the Legislature, at 50; (4) The 
Intent of the Legislature, at 82; (5) Stability, Dynamism, and Other Values, at 
120; (6) Who Should Interpret Statutes?, at 160; (7) Jurors as Statutory 
Interpreters, at 196; (8) Legislatures, Judges, and Statutory Interpretation, at 
223. 
19 Chapter one begins at page 1. 
20 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 1. By “laws,” I assume from the title of his text that he 
means statutes, though he does not say so. 
21 Id. at 1–2. 
22 Id. Solan states that some believe that, “judges attempt to legislate beyond their 
authority by imposing their own glosses and values on statutes that should 
simply be applied as the legislature wrote them.” Id. at 2. Others, Solan notes, 
“believe that the common-law tradition provides a special opportunity for judges 
to continue to do justice, even though so much of the law is statutory.” Id. 
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simply, that judges do.23 Moreover, he notes that because statutory 
language will often leave uncertainty and discretion, the personal 
values of judges will inevitably seep into the statutory interpretation 
analysis.24 But I disagree that the question can be so easily dismissed, 
especially given recent attempts by legislatures, both state and federal, 
to curtail perceived judicial activism.25 
Building on the thesis of his last text,26 Solan specifically 
acknowledges that judges’ political views play a role because judges 
care about the ramifications of their decisions and “cannot help but 
steer the legal system in a direction they believe to be the best course 
when more than one outcome is licensed by a statute whose 
application is not sufficiently clear in a particular case.”27 He does not 
seem overly bothered about his conclusion because “laws 
work . . . most of the time” without judicial intervention.28 Judges are 
involved only some of the time, and when they are, he believes that 
judicial discretion is suitably constrained.29 I found this latter point 
profoundly interesting and surprisingly simple—laws work most of the 
time. By focusing on the hard cases, academics and scholars have 
forgotten that statutes work more often than they do not.30 Solan 
provides a fresh reason for this: laws mirror “ordinary social norms.”31 
Few of us need statutes telling us not to lie, cheat, steal, or kill. Such 
statutes require us to do what we would do anyway. Were there not 
outliers, thrill seekers, or sociopaths, society would not have to enact 
statutes that say that certain behavior is unacceptable and therefore 
punishable.32 Further, the similarity of statutes to morality helps 
explain the intuitive appeal of the plain meaning canon: when 
controversy arises under these types of statutes, Solan suggests that 
application of the plain meaning canon resolves the controversy most 
                                                 
23 Id. at 3. 
24 Id. 
25 See infra text accompanying notes 247–65. 
26 See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text. 
27 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 5. 
28 Id. 4–5. 
29 Id. It is only the hard cases that reach the courts, and only a small handful that 
reach the Supreme Court. Id. 
30 Id. at 15. 
31 Id. at 6. 
32 See id. at 5–6. 
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of the time.33 The sheer number of the non-hard cases in which the 
plain meaning canon can resolve controversy gives this interpretive 
canon intuitive appeal for some legal theorists.34 
Further, Solan notes, when statutes stray from socially expected 
norms, statutes work less well and thus are challenged more often.35 
For example, a statute that prohibits people from taking the life of 
another generates little controversy. But add in a “stand your ground” 
exception and suddenly, the results are less clear. When statutes try to 
regulate conduct that is less universally agreeable, the statutes need to 
be written more clearly and with the possibility of lawyering in mind. 
This concept may help explain why laws used to work better: laws 
used to be less detailed. When laws are less detailed, courts have more 
leeway to fill the gaps, while lawyers have less language to challenge. 
For example, compare the Sherman Act, which was enacted in 1890, 
with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (known 
pejoratively as “Obamacare” or colloquially as “the Health Care Act”), 
which was enacted in 2010.36 The Sherman Act is a comprehensive 
and expansive act regulating federal antitrust activity, and yet it fits 
onto a single page; Congress left significant room for judicial 
development. The Affordable Care Act is a comprehensive and 
expansive act regulating the finest minutia of the healthcare industry, 
and fits on almost 1000 pages; Congress left little room for judicial 
development. Statutes today are far more complex than in the past. 
The tax code is another example that shows that statutes that stray 
from moral values must be more detailed and will be subject to 
increased challenges. Paying taxes to the government is not something 
most of us do willingly; hence, the tax code must be more detailed and 
will inevitably be challenged.37 However, rather than use such legal-
                                                 
33 Id. at 11. 
34 Id. at 13–14. 
35 Id. at 11. 
36 Compare Act of July 2, 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006), with Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
37 See SOLAN, supra note 5, at 11–12 (“[L]aws that attempt to regulate behavior in 
ways that are counterintuitive or in ways to which people would rather not 
conform . . . sometimes create a game of cat and mouse, where the legislature 
attempts to set standards and the [people being] regulated attempt to comply 
with the letter of the law but to thwart its intent by engaging in conduct that is 
largely equivalent to what is not allowed but is different enough in form to come 
outside the law. We see this in such areas as tax shelters . . . .”). 
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based examples, Solan provides a very simplistic example: a New 
York City transit rule that prohibits people from walking between 
subway trains, even when the trains are stopped.38 Perhaps, he thought 
that a simple example might be easier for his linguistic readers to 
grasp, though I think his example is more difficult to follow. Although 
the rule allowing riders to move between trains was changed in 2005, 
New Yorkers did not alter their behavior because moving amongst 
trains was a longstanding tradition.39 Solan says, “[T]he legislature 
intend[ed] to convey a message imposing an obligation on members of 
society, but somehow that message [did] not come through.”40 Solan 
notes that, if a New Yorker were to be prosecuted for violating this 
rule,41 a judge would need to decide whether to interpret the law 
according to its definitional (or dictionary) meaning,42 its ordinary 
meaning (which is different), its purpose, its enacting body’s intent, or 
some other value.43 He claims that he will devote much of the 
remainder of the text to identifying the arguments and debate about 
which factor should be given priority.44 He believes that judges should 
and do feel bound to decide cases within the “range of reasonable 
interpretations that the language of a statute affords or, in unusual 
situations, by articulating a good reason for not doing so (such as a 
legislative error or an obviously anomalous result) . . . .”45 
In the concluding section of this chapter, Solan suggests that he 
will explore how our psychology leads to recurrent difficulties in 
statutory interpretation and why an approach using an “expansive 
                                                 
38 Id. at 6 (“It is a violation to move between end doors of a subway car whether or 
not train is in motion, except in an emergency or when directed by police officer 
or conductor.” (footnote and alterations omitted)). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 9. 
41 After posing this question, Solan digresses to remind us that that the employees 
of the executive are the first to interpret statutes; if the offender did not know 
that the law had been changed, a police officer would be justified in letting the 
individual off with a warning. Id. at 7. 
42 Here, Solan actually said “plain meaning (when the language is unequivocal).” 
Id. at 11. He never discusses this idea in the text; however, he does explain 
definitional meaning. See id. at 53, 62. 
43 Id. at 11. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 4. Nevertheless, he explains that legislative primacy is essential for 
statutory legitimacy, stating that it is “an overarching value in the decision-
making process.” Id. 
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array” of interpretive tools is preferable to one using a narrow array.46 
He concludes: 
The basic argument of the book is that laws generally work well; 
when they fail to provide us with sufficient information to know 
our rights and obligations, it is usually (but by no means always) 
because of uncertainties in how well the concepts contained in a 
statute’s words match the events that are in dispute. That is, most 
problems of statutory interpretation, including most of the famous 
cases, are about problems of conceptualization.47 
While the idea that “laws work well” may be foundational, it alone 
cannot be the thesis of his text, for he has already made this point in 
this chapter, and he made it well.48 Thus, his introduction develops a 
topic that he will explore throughout his text but does not develop a 
thesis. He left the reader ignorant of his purpose. 
B. Why We Need to Interpret Statutes 
If “laws work well,” one may wonder why does anyone need to 
interpret statutes at all. In chapter two,49 with this provocative title, 
Solan offers another novel reason why laws work well: he proclaims 
that statutes are written like classical, dictionary definitions.50 To make 
his point, and he does so very convincingly, he compares the 
dictionary definition of “lie”51 with the federal perjury statute.52 The 
similarities between the structure of the dictionary definition and the 
structure of the statute are hard to ignore.53 The similarity of statutes to 
                                                 
46 Id. at 13. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 4 (“[A]s the argument of this book unfolds I hope to show that laws work 
fairly well.”). 
49 Chapter two begins at page 16. 
50 See SOLAN, supra note 5, at 18. 
51 Id. (“1. To present false information with the intention of deceiving. 2. To 
convey a false image or impression: Appearances often lie.” (citation omitted)). 
52 Id. at 18 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2009) (“Whoever . . . having taken an oath 
before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the 
United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, 
depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or 
certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states 
or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true . . . is 
guilty of perjury.”)). 
53 See id. at 18–19. He then discusses cases interpreting the “very linguistically 
complex” federal bribery statute to explore the types of challenges that are made 
to complex statutes; this section is long and unfocused. Id. at 20–37. 
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dictionary definitions helps English readers understand statutes more 
readily. 
After offering this comparison, Solan notes that psychologists 
divide language capacity into “word” capacity and “rule” capacity.54 
According to Solan, some legal language is “rulelike,” such as syntax 
canons and the perjury statute.55 Other aspects of our legal language 
are “wordlike,” such as the use of words to express concepts.56 While 
acknowledging that this theory is not without controversy, Solan 
nevertheless suggests that rulelike language issues generally involve 
ambiguity because the number of possible meanings is limited and the 
potential meanings are very different from one another, which makes it 
relatively easy for an interpreter to discern the intended word from the 
context.57 Solan provides two classic examples here: “Flying planes 
can be dangerous” and “Visiting relatives can be annoying;” each 
sentence provides two options, only one of which is correct, and the 
correctness is discernible from textual context.58 Solan could have 
added Justice Scalia’s famous statement: “If you tell me, ‘I took the 
boat out on the bay,’ I understand ‘bay’ to mean one thing; if you tell 
me, ‘I put the saddle on the bay,’ I understand it to mean something 
else.”59 Thus, in each of these examples, there are a finite number of 
meanings and textual context resolves the ambiguity. 
To understand wordlike confusion, we must jump ahead to a later 
discussion in which Solan convincingly suggests that people 
understand language in prototypes.60 If I write the word “furniture,” 
likely a couch, bed, table, or chair entered your mind—more likely, a 
lamp or rug did not.61 Similarly, if I write “bird,” you might have 
thought of a robin or bluebird, but not an ostrich—Solan calls the 
pictures that these words evoke in our minds “prototypes.”62 Thus, it 
                                                 





58 Id. at 39–40 (quoting NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 21 
(1965)). 
59 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 26 (1997). 
60 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 65. 
61 Id. at 63. 
62 Id. at 64–65 (concluding, “What all this means for legal interpretation is that the 
choice between definitional and ordinary meaning is only natural.”). Solan uses 
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would seem that the more similar the issue before a court is to the 
evoked prototype (picture), the more likely the court will find that the 
language of the statute covers the issue. In other words, the more 
similar the issue is to the prototype, the less confusion that arises, and 
the less similar the issue is to the prototype, the more likely confusion 
will arise. Solan does not tie the prototype analysis into the wordlike 
discussion, but the two seem entwined. Wordlike confusion arises not 
because the language at issue is ambiguous (meaning it has more than 
one reasonable interpretation), but because the language at issue is 
“vague at the margins.”63 For wordlike confusion, there are 
“innumerable possible meanings.”64 And, unlike rulelike confusion, 
textual context does not readily resolve which meaning was intended,65 
because wordlike confusion “require[s] subtle judgments of line 
drawing to determine whether one interpretation or another fits a 
situation best.”66 Solan suggests that many of the more famous 
statutory interpretation cases involved wordlike confusion: for 
example, does a minister’s work count as “labor;”67 is an airplane a 
“vehicle;”68 and does an individual “use” a gun when he barters it for 
drugs?69 Solan says the issue of whether a minister’s work is “labor” is 
unclear only because the word “labor” “becomes vague at the margins, 
making it hard to tell whether we would consider it fair to equate 
                                                                                                                   
the Paula Jones case as an example to show that people had a prototype of the 
words “lie” and “perjury.” Id. at 65. Most people had no doubt that former 
President Clinton lied, but because most people understood the basis for the lie, 
they did not consider his lie to be perjury. Id. 
63 Id. at 40. 
64 Id. at 38–39. 
65 Id. at 39. 
66 Id. at 39. 
67 See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (holding 
that a minister’s work was not labor because the intent of congress was simply 
to stay the influx of this cheap, unskilled labor). 
68 See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (“When a rule of conduct 
is laid down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of 
vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft simply 
because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation 
that if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have 
been used.”). 
69 See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 236–37 (1993) (“Because the phrase 
‘uses . . . a firearm’ is broad enough in ordinary usage to cover use of a firearm 
as an item of barter or commerce . . . . [W]e conclude that using a firearm in a 
guns-for-drugs trade may constitute ‘us[ing] a firearm[.]’”). 
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preaching and labor.”70 I would add that it is unclear because of 
prototype. In other words, “labor” evokes a picture, for some of us that 
picture would include pastoring, but for many of us it would not. 
Regardless, the word is not ambiguous in a rulelike way. 
Not surprisingly, the different theorists approach wordlike 
confusion differently. Adherents of textualism, a rulelike approach, 
would turn to a dictionary to see if ministering is included within the 
definition of the word “labor.”71 Solan suggests that when interpreters 
approach wordlike confusion in a rulelike manner, they may well 
make a fortress of the dictionary.72 Those who reject textualism and 
use a wordlike approach would eschew the dictionary and turn instead 
to legislative intent, wanting to know how closely the concept of 
“preaching” fits with the prototype of Congress’ laborer.73 
Solan compares two cases that demonstrate the contrast between 
the rulelike and wordlike approaches. In United States v. Wiltberger, 
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether federal courts had 
jurisdiction over a defendant who committed manslaughter while on 
an American merchant marine vessel sailing on the Tigris River in 
China. 74 The relevant statute criminalized homicides committed “upon 
the high seas.”75 The question for the Court was whether this statute 
should be interpreted to include homicides that occurred in rivers in 
foreign countries.76 Likely, Congress would have so intended, but the 
language of the statute was very narrowly drafted.77 Applying a 
wordlike approach and the rule of lenity, Chief Justice Marshall 
accepted that statutory language becomes “vague at the margins” and 
refused to interpret the statute broadly.78 In this case, there was no 
                                                 
70 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 40 (introducing the cases of Church of the Holy Trinity, 




74 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 77 (1820). 
75 Id. at 78 (quoting Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 12, 1 Stat. 112, 115). 
76 Id. at 99 (“It is observable, that this section, in its description of [jurisdiction], 
omits the words, ‘in any river, haven, basin, or bay,’ and uses the words ‘high 
seas’ only.”). 
77 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 42. 
78 Id. at 41–42. 
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ambiguity in the language, only a very narrowly drafted statute: rivers 
are not the high sea.79 
In contrast, in United States v. Winn, Justice Story applied a 
rulelike approach in a criminal case.80 In Winn, the issue for the Court 
was whether a ship’s chief officer was a member of the ship’s 
“crew.”81 Justice Story refused to apply the rule of lenity saying 
instead, “I know of no authority, which would justify the court in 
restricting [general words] to one class, or in giving them the 
narrowest interpretation, where the mischief to be redressed by the 
statute is equally applicable to all of them.”82 Turning to the 
dictionary, a rulelike approach, Justice Story concluded that the 
dictionary defined the word “crew” to include all the members of the 
ship.83 These two examples help highlight the differences between the 
rulelike and wordlike approaches; both cases involved narrowly drawn 
criminal statutes, the rule of lenity, and wordlike confusion. Yet they 
came to opposite results. 
C. Definitions, Ordinary Meaning, and Respect for the 
Legislature 
Years ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes said, “We do not inquire what 
the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”84 Solan’s 
next chapter, chapter three,85 turns to the language of the statute. First, 
however, Solan debunks the notion that the various approaches to 
statutory interpretation differ significantly.86 Comparing intentionalist-
based approaches87 with text-based approaches, he claims that both 
have more commonalities than differences.88 One commonality he 
                                                 
79 Id. at 42. 
80 Id. at 43 (discussing United States v. Winn, 28 F. Cas. 733 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1838)). 
81 United States v. Winn, 28 F. Cas. at 733–34. 
82 Id. at 734. 
83 Id. 
84 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 
417 (1899), reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COLLECTED 
LEGAL PAPERS 203, 207 (1920). 
85 Chapter three begins at page 50. 
86 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 50–51. 
87 Id. at 50. Because Solan does not distinguish between intentionalists and 
purposivists, his analysis is less complete than it should be. 
88 Id. at 51. 
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notes is that for all theorists the text of a statute is paramount.89 He 
notes that intentionalist-based theorists do not ignore text as is often 
claimed;90 rather, intentionalists “take a pragmatic, eclectic approach 
to the interpretation of statutes, relying upon whatever information 
appears to provide an interpretation that is loyal to the language of the 
statute and the intent of its drafters and is coherent with the code in 
general.”91 
A second commonality Solan notes is that all theorists consider 
context.92 Text-based theorists are not blindly devoted to the text 
despite their strong rhetoric; text-based theorists abjure only one type 
of context: legislative history offered as evidence of legislative 
intent.93 Textualists regularly turn to other types of context, such as 
earlier judicial interpretive decisions, background assumptions shared 
by the relevant community, constitutional considerations, and 
coherence with related statutes.94 Thus, text-based theorists differ only 
in their willingness to consider one form of context: legislative 
history.95 
A third commonality he notes is that both share a commitment to 
legislative primacy as the core value in statutory interpretation.96 All 
theorists believe that once the legislature has enacted statutory 
                                                 
89 Id. at 50–51. 
90 Id. at 51. However, I am not so sure that it is often claimed that intentionalists 
ignore text completely; rather, sometimes intentionalists reject ambiguous text 
(rarely clear text) to further legislative intent. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 52–53. 
93 Id. at 52. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. Solan’s analysis is less nuanced than it should be. Only some textualists, 
notably Justices Scalia and Thomas and Judge Easterbrook, are so rigid. For a 
discussion of the various forms of textualism, see Linda D. Jellum, The Art of 
Statutory Interpretation, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 59, 66–86 (2010). Most 
textualists are willing to consider legislative history at some point in the 
interpretation process, for example if the statutory ambiguity cannot be resolved 
with intrinsic sources. Id. These textualists use a linear approach to resolving 
ambiguity, checking each source in a prescribed hierarchical order and 
beginning with intrinsic sources and moving to policy-based sources. Id. For a 
discussion of the types of sources, see generally, LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13–15 (2008). 
96 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 51 (“What the two sides share is a commitment to 
legislative primacy as the core value in statutory interpretation.”). 
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language, the common law court’s ability to fashion a remedy is 
curtailed.97 
Solan next returns to his rulelike/wordlike dichotomy to develop 
an interesting, and unusual, explanation for why interpreters come to 
opposite conclusions regarding a word’s meaning when they apply the 
plain meaning canon.98 Interpreters apply the plain meaning canon 
because they believe that legislatures likely meant to use words in their 
ordinary sense.99 Solan distinguishes between a word’s rulelike, or 
definitional, meaning—the meaning provided by a dictionary—with its 
wordlike, or ordinary, meaning—the meaning most people would 
ascribe to the word regardless of the dictionary.100 He laments that the 
use of dictionaries is on the rise: “Without question . . . the biggest 
change in the search for word meaning is the almost obsessive 
attention courts now pay to dictionaries, using them as authority for 
ordinary meaning.”101 He notes that, until the late twentieth century, 
Supreme Court Justices used dictionaries infrequently.102 Indeed, in 
the 200 years preceding Justice Scalia’s appointment, the Court 
referred to “ordinary meaning” in close proximity to the word 
dictionary just six times; in contrast, from the time of his appointment 
though 2008, the Court did so twenty-one times.103 This significant 
increase is not necessarily a good one. 
Dictionaries provide definitional meanings, not ordinary 
meanings.104 They establish the outer boundaries of appropriate usage 
of words.105 Yet, most of the time, the issue facing a court is not 
whether the legislature intended one meaning rather than another (a 
rulelike choice), but rather whether the legislature would have 
expected the statute to apply to the specific facts before the court (a 
wordlike, or prototype, choice).106 “[D]ictionary definitions most often 
do little to aid in that inquiry,”107 because most of the time it is not the 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 53. 
99 Id. at 103. 
100 Id. at 53, 62. 
101 Id. at 76. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. Solan notes that Justice Thomas has jumped on the bandwagon. Id. 
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outer boundaries of the words we are looking for but the similarity of 
the issue before the court to the prototype the legislature had in 
mind.108 By using dictionaries, text-based theorists give themselves a 
broader range of apparently legitimate meanings to choose from, 
making it less necessary for them to consider anything beyond the 
text.109 
Definitional meanings are rulelike, while ordinary meanings are 
wordlike. The different theorists often use different meanings when 
applying the plain meaning canon: text-based theorists typically use 
definitional meanings, although not always, and intentionalist-based 
theorists typically use ordinary meaning, although not always.110 For 
example in Church of the Holy Trinity, Justice Brewer understood and 
acknowledged that the pastor’s activities fell within the definitional 
meaning of the word “labor.”111 But that fact was irrelevant, pastoral 
activities were not within the ordinary meaning, or prototype, of that 
term, at least not at the time: ministers were not thought of as cheap, 
unskilled laborers.112 Thus, Justice Brewer concluded that when the 
legislature chose to use the word “labor” in the context of this statute, 
the legislature most likely had in mind physical labor.113 Hence, 
Justice Brewer chose the ordinary meaning, using a wordlike 
                                                 
108 Id. at 64–65, 76. 
109 Id. at 76. Additionally, as Solan notes, “Once judges begin to fight over which 
dictionary to consult, the use of dictionaries to determine ordinary meaning is 
virtually futile.” Id. 
110 For example, in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), Justice Scalia, a textualist, used ordinary meaning to understand the 
meaning of the word “use,” while, Justice O’Connor, an intentionalist, turned to 
dictionary meaning. 
111 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) 
(acknowledging that that the pastor’s activities “may be within the letter of the 
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the 
intention of its makers.”). 
112 Id. at 463 (“Obviously the thought expressed in [the word “labor”] reaches only 
to the work of the manual laborer, as distinguished from that of the professional 
man. No one reading such a title would suppose that congress had in its mind 
any purpose of staying the coming into this country of ministers of the gospel, 
or, indeed, of any class whose toil is that of the brain. The common 
understanding of the terms ‘labor’ and ‘laborers’ does not include preaching and 
preachers, and it is to be assumed that words and phrases are used in their 
ordinary meaning.”). 
113 Id. 
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approach.114 Those who criticize his decision prefer a rulelike, 
definitional approach. 
Perhaps the classic example demonstrating the difference between 
the use of definitional meaning and ordinary meaning in interpretation 
is the classic dispute between Justices Scalia and O’Connor in a 
triumvirate of cases beginning in 1993 with Smith v. United States.115 
The dispute involved the meaning of the word “use” in a statute 
imposing a mandatory five-year prison term for using or carrying a 
firearm “during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.”116 
This example is particularly instructive because, Justice Scalia, a noted 
textualist, eloquently explains why he chooses the ordinary meaning, 
while Justice O’Connor, an intentionalist-based theorist, 
unpersuasively explains why the definitional meaning is 
appropriate.117 In Smith, the issue was whether the defendant “use[d] 
or carr[ied] a firearm” in relation to a drug trafficking crime when he 
bartered an unloaded gun for drugs.118 Writing for the majority, Justice 
O’Connor claimed that she was looking for the ordinary meaning of 
the word “use,” but instead turned directly to three dictionaries to 
prove that the word “use” was broad enough to include bartering.119 
Justice O’Connor confused dictionary meaning with ordinary meaning. 
Dissenting, Justice Scalia quarreled with Justice O’Connor’s claim 
that she had discerned the ordinary meaning: 
                                                 
114 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 54–55 (stating that Church of the Holy Trinity can be 
understood “as an example of a Court struggling between these two different 
notions of word meaning and choosing the ordinary-meaning approach over the 
definitional-meaning approach, much in the style of contemporary textualists.”). 
Similarly, in McBoyle v. United States, the Court used a wordlike approach to 
hold that the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act did not apply to airplanes. Id. at 
55 (citing McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26 (1931)). That statute 
applied to the following: “automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, 
motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on 
rails.” Id. Justice Holmes applied the plain meaning canon and ejusdem generis 
and held airplanes were not covered because the ordinary meaning of “vehicles” 
included only things that run on land. Id. According to Solan, Justice Holmes 
used prototype terminology when he noted that the definition lead to a “picture 
of a thing moving on land.” Id. 
115 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
116 Id. at 225 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1990)). 
117 Compare id. at 228–38 (O’Connor, J., 6-3 majority), with id. at 242–43 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
118 Id. at 228 (O’Connor, J.). 
119 Id. at 229. 
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To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended 
purpose. . . . The Court does not appear to grasp the distinction 
between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used. It 
would, indeed, be “both reasonable and normal to say that 
petitioner ‘used’ his MAC-10 in his drug trafficking offense by 
trading it for cocaine.” It would also be reasonable and normal to 
say that he “used” it to scratch his head. When one wishes to 
describe the action of employing the instrument of a firearm for 
such unusual purposes, “use” is assuredly a verb one could select. 
But that says nothing about whether the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase “uses a firearm” embraces such extraordinary 
employments.120 
What quickly becomes clear is that the two Justices were fighting 
about whether to use the definitional or ordinary meaning of the word 
“use.” They were not fighting about what the word “use” meant once 
that choice was made; indeed, both acknowledged and responded to 
each other’s argument that “use” meant what the other said it meant.121 
Solan equates Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion to Justice Brewer’s 
opinion in Holy Trinity, likely to Justice Scalia’s horror, because in 
both cases the Justices chose the ordinary meaning rather than the 
definitional meaning.122 As Justice Brewer so eloquently stated, “It is a 
familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet 
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the 
intention of its makers.”123 
                                                 
120 Id. at 242–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
121 Justice Scalia’s rejection of Justice O’Connor’s interpretation was included 
above. Justice O’Connor rejected the argument that the ordinary meaning of 
“using a firearm” was to use the firearm as a weapon and responded, “It is one 
thing to say that the ordinary meaning of ‘uses a firearm’ includes using a 
firearm as a weapon, since that is the intended purpose of a firearm and the 
example of ‘use’ that most immediately comes to mind. But it is quite another to 
conclude that, as a result, the phrase also excludes any other use.” Id. at 230. 
122 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 57. 
123 Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). Solan also notes that 
application of definitional meaning could lead to absurdity. SOLAN, supra note 
5, at 61. For example, in United States v. Kirby, a sheriff was prosecuted under a 
statute that made it illegal to “knowingly and willfully obstruct or retard the 
passage of the mail, or of any driver or carrier . . . carrying the same” after the 
sheriff arrested a mail carrier who was wanted for murder. Id. (quoting United 
States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 482 (1868)). While the sheriff’s conduct 
fit within the definitional meaning of “obstruct or retard the passage of mail, or 
of any driver or carrier . . . carrying the same,” the Court refused to uphold the 
conviction, claiming that this interpretation was not within the ordinary meaning 
of the statute. Id. 
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As Solan notes, Justice O’Connor’s explanation falls flat: the word 
“use” has a range of dictionary definitions (it is vague and broad, not 
ambiguous) such that the word’s meaning must be derived from 
textual context.124 In other words, dictionary definitions of such a word 
are meant to be broad and cover all possible uses of the word, not to 
identify the ordinary use of the word in relationship to the item being 
used. 
Of further note, the Smith Court did not address whether the 
defendant “carried” the gun.125 In a subsequent case the Court held that 
defendants who knowingly possess and convey a firearm in a vehicle, 
including in a locked glove compartment or the trunk of a car, carry 
that firearm.126 In this case, the Court again confused definitional 
meaning with ordinary meaning. Consider whether carrying a firearm 
in a glove compartment or in the trunk of a car falls within the 
ordinary meaning of “carry” in connection with a firearm. Solan 
argues that it does not.127 The fact that the qualifier “in a glove 
compartment” or “in the trunk of a car” is added shows that the 
individual did not carry the firearm on his person.128 One would not 
say, “He carried the gun on his person” to indicate that the gun was 
carried by hand. Rather, one might say, “He carried the gun in his 
pocket” to show where the gun was carried but not to show that gun 
was carried on the person. In the car example, the word “transport” 
would better convey the meaning of carrying a firearm in a glove 
compartment or in the trunk of a car.129 But the Court missed this 
point. This distinction between ordinary meaning and definitional 
meaning is insightful, and Solan’s example is fitting. 
                                                 
124 See SOLAN, supra note 5, at 57–58. 
125 In Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995), the Court addressed this 
question and held that a defendant who carried a gun in a car did not “use” a 
firearm within the meaning of the statute because “use” denoted active 
employment, not mere possession. The Court remanded the case to the lower 
court to determine whether the defendant “carried” the gun in relation to a drug 
trafficking crime. Id. at 151. And, while the Court confirmed that bartering a 
gun for drugs was active employment, the Court rejected the argument that 
receiving a gun in barter was active employment. Watson v. United States, 552 
U.S. 74, 82–83 (2007). 
126 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126–27 (1998). 
127 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 77. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 77–78. 
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Ordinary meaning should not control in all cases. Solan suggests 
that judges should use ordinary meaning as a rule of thumb or starting 
point,130 because the ordinary meaning is most likely what the 
legislature intended.131 But he acknowledges that sometimes the 
legislature intended a different meaning.132 Moreover, he admits that it 
is not always easy to tell what the ordinary meaning is.133 While some 
                                                 
130 Id. at 69 (“Thus, the ordinary-meaning approach to statutory interpretation may 
act as a reasonable initial hypothesis for determining the intent of the legislature, 
but it is no more than a rule of thumb whose application is inappropriate in a 
wide range of situations.”). 
131 Id. at 66. 
132 Id. at 68. Solan provides the case of Chisom v. Roemer as an example. Id. at 67–
68 (citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991)). In Chisom, the Court had to 
determine whether section two of the Voting Rights Act, which protected 
individuals’ rights to elect “representatives,” applied to the election of state 
judges. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 384. The petitioners, black voters, alleged that 
Louisiana’s method of electing two Justices to the State Supreme Court at-large 
from the New Orleans area impermissibly diluted the minority vote; the state 
responded that the Act did not apply to the election of state judges because 
judges were not “representatives.” Id. at 384–85, 389. The state was simply 
noting the ordinary meaning and prototype: one would not pictures judges when 
the word “representatives” was said. 
The Court opted for the definitional meaning because the legislative history 
showed that Congress changed the term “legislators” to “representatives.” Id. at 
389. Prior to its amendment, there was no question that judges were covered. Id. 
at 390. The amendment had responded to a judicial interpretation of the statute 
that had required proof of an intent to discriminate. Id. at 393. The amendment 
eliminated this intent requirement. Id. at 394. The majority concluded that had 
Congress intended, by using the word “representatives,” to exclude vote dilution 
claims involving judges, “Congress would have made it explicit in the statute, or 
at least some of the Members would have identified or mentioned it at some 
point in the unusually extensive legislative history of the 1982 amendment.” Id. 
at 396. Thus, because no legislator had ever suggested that judicial elections 
would no longer be covered, Congress must have meant to maintain the status 
quo in this regard. Id. at 404. Solan thinks this interpretation was appropriate, 
given that the legislature was trying to broaden the statute. SOLAN, supra note 5, 
at 67. 
133 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 70. How does a judge determine what ordinary meaning 
is? “The answer, somewhat to the embarrassment of the American legal system, 
is that courts find ordinary meaning anywhere they look, and judges are not 
restrained in deciding where they are willing to look.” Id. For example, in Bailey 
v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150–51 (1995), the Court held that having a gun 
in the trunk of a car was not “use” because active employment was required. 
Justice O’Connor said statutes should be interpreted in context. Id. at 143. And 
while she reaffirmed the holding in Smith, she did not use the definitional 
approach, likely because she would have reached the same result as in Smith. Id. 
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lexicographers do include information about how words are typically, 
or ordinarily, used, this practice is not systematic.134 Finally, the 
definitional meaning approach is appealing because it is consistent 
with how judges think and with how we think rules, or laws, should 
work.135 “[T]he definitional approach appears, at least superficially, to 
be the more ‘lawlike’ of the two [approaches]. . . . [L]aws are 
themselves structured as definitions.”136 For these reasons, the 
definitional approach should not be abandoned entirely.137 But Solan 
                                                                                                                   
at 147–48 (citing Smith, 508 U.S. at 236). Instead, she said used a linguistic 
argument, saying, “I use a gun to protect my house, but I’ve never had to use it.” 
SOLAN, supra note 5, at 71 (citing Bailey, 508 U.S. at 143). Solan points out that 
this argument, indeed this exact example, had previously been made in a law 
review article jointly written by a law professor and a linguist, though Justice 
O’Connor did not cite to it. Id. at 71 (citing Clark D. Cunningham & Charles J. 
Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A Linguistic Perspective on Judicial 
Interpretation of “Use a Firearm,” 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1995)). Solan 
admits that reliance on linguists is unusual. Id. It is more common for judges to 
provide their own linguistic arguments. For example, in Watson, the Court 
rejected the government’s argument, saying that “[t]he Government may say 
that a person ‘uses’ a firearm simply by receiving it in a barter transaction, but 
no one else would.” Id. (citing Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 79 (2007)). 
And in Muscarello, in response to the defendant’s argument that “carry” meant 
on one’s person, both the majority and dissent turned to the bible, literature, 
newspapers, legal dictionaries, and ordinary dictionaries to show that their 
meaning was correct. Id. at 72–73 (citing Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 
125, 127–39 (1998)). 
Where should courts look? Id. at 74. Solan states that the answer depends on 
what judges are looking for. If they are truly looking for ordinary meaning, then 
introspection may be sufficient. Id. Solan examined 122 cases from turn of 
century on (39% decided after 1980) discussing ordinary meaning. Id. at 75. The 
predominant method for determining ordinary meaning was introspection. Id. 
“Without fanfare, judges simply rely upon their own sense of how common 
words are typically used.” Id. For the most part, what judges say these words 
means makes sense. Id. After 1980, introspection declined in popularity, and 
was replaced by dictionaries, precedent, and the use of similar language in the 
same and in other statutes. Id. Solan suggests that Scalia’s textualism, so 
influential in American jurisprudence, is a departure from legal tradition. Id. 
134 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 76. 
135 Id. at 69. Justice Scalia bolstered the use of dictionaries; of all the Justices, he 
uses dictionaries the most frequently. Id. 
136 Id. at 66. 
137 Id. “Language, whether ordinary or plain, works well—but not that well.” Id. at 
80. “[W]hile the problems that trigger difficult questions of statutory 
interpretation are often psychological and linguistic, decisions about how 
statutory interpretation should proceed are legal and political decisions . . . .” Id. 
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provides little guidance for when judges should favor definitional 
meaning over ordinary meaning. One possibility is that judges could 
apply the technical meaning rule: 
Unless a word or phrase is defined in the statute or rule being 
construed, its meaning is determined by its context, the rules of 
grammar, and common usage. A word or phrase that has acquired 
a technical or particular meaning in a particular context has that 
meaning it if is used in that context.138 
The critical inquiry then is audience.139 In other words, let me suggest 
that definitional meaning is nothing more than a subcategory of 
technical meaning. 
As he concludes this chapter, Solan simultaneously praises the 
text-based theorists for refocusing the search on ordinary meaning and 
the plain meaning canon, then chastises them for losing site of the 
difference between definitional and ordinary meaning.140 One could 
say that the text-based theorists started a dictionary revolution, forcing 
the debate into a childhood fight with the bullies yelling all the while, 
“my dictionary is better than your dictionary.”141 Or, as Solan so 
                                                 
138 UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT, § 2 (1995). 
139 The quintessential technical meaning case is Nix v. Heddon,149 U.S. 304 
(1893), in which the Court had to determine whether a tomato was a fruit or 
vegetable. Lexicographers and botanists both define a tomato as a fruit, but the 
court rejected that interpretation and adopted the ordinary meaning. Id. at 306–
07. However, most people think of tomatoes as vegetables. Id. at 306. The 
distinction between ordinary meaning and technical meaning is based on the 
audience and its relation to the speaker. SOLAN, supra note 5, at 79 (citing Nix, 
149 U.S. at 307). 
140 See SOLAN, supra note 5, at 80. 
141 According to the Justices, not all dictionaries are equal. In MCI Telecomms. 
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–28 (1994), Justice Scalia, for 
the majority, identified a number of different dictionaries with similar 
definitions of the word at issue: “modify.” While the majority of dictionaries 
suggested that modify meant a minor change, one dictionary, Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary, suggested that modify could mean either a minor 
or a major change. Id. at 225–26. The Court rejected the latter definition and the 
appropriateness of that dictionary. Id. at 227. “Virtually every dictionary we are 
aware of says that ‘to modify’ means to change moderately or in minor fashion.” 
Id. at 225. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia cited widespread criticism of 
this dictionary when it was published for its “portrayal of common error as 
proper usage.” Id. at 228 n.3. Apparently, Webster’s Third was too colloquial to 
be considered authoritative for this Court. But if the point of statutory 
interpretation is to find the meaning an audience member would likely ascribe to 
the language as textualists argue, why is colloquialism not a good thing? This 
dictionary fight seems reminiscent of the difference between definitional 
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eloquently says, “The argument resembles a food fight in a school for 
children with disciplinary problems more than a serious argument 
among distinguished jurists.”142 
D. The Intent of the Legislature 
In the last chapter, chapter three, Solan explained why 
disagreements about meaning arise when interpreters rely solely on the 
language of the statute and the plain meaning canon. In the next 
chapter, chapter four,143 Solan turns to the question about “what it 
means to be faithful to the legislature,” and to the question of whether 
legislative history should be part of the interpretive process.144 He 
suggests that the greatest controversy in statutory interpretation in the 
last two decades has revolved around the use of legislative history.145 
He notes that individuals are passionate about how to be faithful to the 
legislature, but there is no debate about whether to be faithful.146 
Critics of the use of legislative history raise two primary 
objections:147 first, legislative intent is not what interpreters should be 
                                                                                                                   
meaning and ordinary meaning, yet the Justices simply did not see it. The 
ordinary meaning of modify is a modest change; while a definitional meaning of 
modify might include substantial change. 
142 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 74. 
143 Chapter four begins at page 82. 
144 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 82. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 120. 
147 Critics also argue that it is undemocratic to rely on legislative history because it 
is not enacted law, it is unreliable, and it is often incoherent. Adrian Vermeule, 
Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of 
Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1839 (1998). Importantly, the very 
idea of searching for legislative intent is under attack. Id. at 1896. Additionally, 
one might ask, whose intent matters: “the 51st senator, needed to pass the bill, or 
the 67th, needed to break the southern filibuster?” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET 
AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 227 (2d ed. 2006) 
(referring to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Justice Scalia says that he 
does not search for legislative intent, rather he searches for “the objective 
indication of the words . . . [because that] is what constitutes the law.” SOLAN, 
supra note 5, at 85 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 
29–30). Thus, legislative history is irrelevant to Justice Scalia precisely because 
legislative intent is irrelevant. Id. But Justice Scalia argues further that, in 
99.99% of the statutory construction cases that reach the Court, there is no 
legislative intent—so even if you are looking for it, you will not find it. Id. at 
85–86. “If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, 
was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more 
208 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 184 
looking for; and second, even if legislative intent is what interpreters 
should be looking for, legislative history is not the best evidence of 
intent.148 They ask, why should interpreters care what legislators 
intended when the statute provides proof of what they said?149 
Ultimately, Solan disagrees with those who eschew the use of 
legislative history entirely but agrees that some of their criticism has 
merit.150 He concludes that looking for legislative intent is unavoidable 
and appropriate but suggests that the issue of “[w]hether legislative 
history is good evidence of legislative intent is another matter.”151 He 
notes, somewhat surprisingly, that while judges may at times be sloppy 
or even wrong about reviewing legislative history, the error rarely 
matters.152 He asks, “How often does a dissenting or concurring 
opinion, or a well-researched law review article, show that judges 
actually misuse legislative history in a way that seriously threatens a 
legal system based on acceptable legal values? It happens, but not very 
often.”153 More often, judges are simply sloppy.154 Further, he notes 
that, “Many of Justice Scalia’s opinions that disapprove of the use of 
legislative history are concurring opinions—not dissents. Even he, 
                                                                                                                   
promising candidate than legislative history.” Id. at 86–87 (quoting Conroy v. 
Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
148 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 115. 
149 Id. at 82. As proof, the quote Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 1899 statement, “[w]e do 
not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means,” 
continues to be widely quoted today. Id. at 82 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899)). 
150 Id. at 83. Empirical research shows that Congress is far more likely to enact 
legislation to overrule judicial decisions based on a the plain meaning canon 
than it is to enact legislation to overrule judicial decisions based on a statute’s 
legislative history, purpose, and policy. Id. at 97 (citing William N. Eskridge Jr., 
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 
331, 350 tbl.8 (1991)). 
151 Id. at 115. Solan defends uses that are compatible with the democratic process, 
but rejects uses that are not, such as the use of floor debate remarks. Id. at 83. 
Solan rejects floor debate remarks as evidence of legislative intent because they 
are “stray remarks from individual legislators” and do not generally reflect the 
intent of the legislature as a whole. Id. at 97. Floor debates are the least reliable 
type of legislative history because they are “laden with sales talk . . . to finesse 
the courts” choices. Id. In contrast, members of the subgroup of planners, 
whether legislators, agency personnel, or others, who have expressed their 
intentions about a bill provide “relevant context.” Id. 
152 Id. at 115–16. 
153 Id. at 115. 
154 Id. 
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then, usually agrees with the result that the Court reaches when it uses 
this information.”155 Solan admits that, to make a better case for the 
use of legislative history, one must show “just how often it is 
demonstrably useful and, when it is, how often it does enough good to 
justify the cost of digging it up.”156 Offering little new to the debate, 
however, he simply suggests that more research should be done in this 
area.157 
Incorporating philosophy,158 Solan responds to Max Radin’s now-
famous 1930 observation about the problems with attributing intent to 
a group of legislators: “The chances that . . . several hundred men each 
will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible 
reductions of a given [statutory issue], are infinitesimally small.”159 
Using the very simplistic example of a married couple making 
vacation plans, Solan explains that there are groups that can and do 
have a unified intent and groups that do not.160 Likely, one of the pair 
would make the plans, and the other would just tag along.161 Yet, when 
asked where the couple intended to go for vacation, the response 
would be unified even though only one of the pair actually planned the 
vacation.162 This group has a unified intent. Even though the 
individuals had different tasks—one planned while the other placidly 
tagged along—the tag-along committed himself as part of the couple 
to the vacation plan.163 If at the last minute the tag-along said that he 
would be going golfing or fishing with his buddies rather than to 
Virginia with his wife, he would certainly cause consternation.164 
Solan’s example shows that we can and do speak of the intent of a 
group even though the members of the group do not know and plan 
                                                 
155 Id. at 189. 
156 Id. at 116. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 89 (turning to “plural subject theory” as explained by philosopher 
Margaret Gilbert (citing generally MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY (2000))). 
159 Id. at 83–84 (quoting Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 
863, 870 (1930)). 
160 Id. at 89–90. 
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every detail.165 Solan’s couple can intend to go to Virginia for their 
vacation without knowing where they will stay, when they will leave, 
when they will return, or what they will eat.166 As Solan parallels: 
“Congress builds a ship and charts its initial course, but the ship’s 
ports-of-call, safe harbors and ultimate destination may be a 
product of the ship’s captain, the weather, and other factors not 
identified at the time the ship sets sail. This model understands a 
statute as an on-going process (a voyage) in which both the 
shipbuilder and subsequent navigators play a role. The dimensions 
and structure of the craft determine where it is capable of going, 
but the current course is set primarily by the crew on board.”167 
Additionally, Solan says that groups need not share a common 
purpose to have a unified intent.168 The vacation planner may have 
wished to see somewhere she has never been, while the tag-along may 
have wished to stay close to home or to keep the vacation costs 
down.169 While their purposes in traveling to Virginia may vary, they 
share a unified intent: to go on vacation.170 Like the intent of his 
                                                 
165 Legislators are busy and must rely on the “judgment of trusted colleagues” to 
complete the work. Id. at 95 (quoting Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank 
& Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 267–77 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring). Charles 
Tiefer calls this justification the “busy Congress model” and identifies cases in 
which the courts cites this rationale. Id. at 95 (citing Charles Tiefer, The 
Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. 
REV. 206, 209, 252–53 (2000)). Justices Stevens and Breyer use this 
justification regularly. Id. The idea that legislators may have different reasons 
for voting for a bill does not necessarily equate with the idea that they have 
different perspectives on the way the law should be enforced. Id. at 96. The 
reality is the legislators do not really think about the “small details,” knowing 
that others will work these things out. Id. 
In addition, the legislators’ reliance on committee members to work these things 
out is part of the constitutionally prescribed formal process: “Article I, section 5 
of the Constitution states, ‘Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings.’” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5). Throughout our history, 
both chambers have operated via the committee structure. Id. Such a large body 
with such broad powers could not operate otherwise. Id. 
166 Id. at 90–91. 
167 Id. at 92 (quoting T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21 (1988)). 
168 Id. at 91. 
169 Id. at 91. 
170 Id. at 91. Solan provides a second example of a group having a unified intent: a 
group of homeowners who are opposed to a statute or a homeless shelter being 
located in their neighborhood. Id. at 90. 
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vacationing couple, Solan suggests that we can talk about the intent of 
a legislature even though each legislator might not share the purpose 
we attribute to the body as a whole.171 
Solan suggests that we regularly explain peoples’ behavior by 
presuming their intent.172 For example, if an individual were to leave a 
room angry, we might say that the individual got mad at something 
that was said to him and left.173 The more a group has individual-like 
qualities, the more we will attribute the group’s behavior to a unified 
intent.174 A group is capable of forming a unified intent when the 
group has similarity, proximity, formation of a symmetrical pattern,175 
and a “common fate.”176 The more of these factors the group has, the 
more it will seem like a person, with a unitary identity and 
personality.177 Solan is clear that not every collection of people can be 
considered a group capable of forming a unified intent. 178 For 
example, a bunch of people standing at a bus stop would not have a 
unified intent; they are not members of a coherent group.179 They have 
a common purpose—waiting for the buss—but no unified intent. “In 
contrast . . . the legislature is a group by virtue of a host of legal and 
social institutions, voting practices, and understandings about how its 
members’ purpose is represented during the legislative process.”180 
After explaining how a group can have a unified intent, Solan 
suggests that the search for legislative intent “is a rule-of-law 
value.”181 Solan argues that even legislative history phobics talk in 
intentionalist terms, and he provides a few examples.182 He believes 
                                                 
171 Id. at 90. 
172 Id. at 93 (“[W]e explain the behavior of other people in terms of their intent.”). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 94. 
175 Id. at 92–93. This terminology is not explained. But essentially, the more a 
group has a unitary identity, personality, a past, a present, and a future, the more 
we perceive that group as an entity or person. Id. at 93. 
176 Id. at 92–93. 
177 Id. at 93. 
178 Id. at 92. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 117. 
182 Id. at 102–04. In one such example, Solan notes that even Justice Scalia has 
referred to legislative intent: 
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that the “courts should indeed take legislative intent into account and 
then make a decision as to whether evidence of legislative intent that 
contradicts the ordinary [meaning] of the statute should be given 
priority over the language itself.”183 “In most cases,” Solan says, “the 
language of the statute does lead to the conclusion that only one 
interpretation is possible.”184 
E. Stability, Dynamism, and Other Values 
His next chapter, chapter five,185 is a catchall chapter. He addresses 
the sources that he has not covered so far; however, he does so in a 
very conclusive manner. For the most part, he merely identifies other 
sources, which he calls “values,” that play a role in the interpretive 
process.186 These values include fair notice and the rule of lenity,187 
stability and stare decisis,188 dynamism,189 remedial statutes,190 
                                                                                                                   
Such a system of justice seems to me so arbitrary that it is difficult 
to believe Congress intended it. Had Congress meant to cast its 
carjacking net so broadly it could have achieved that result—and 
eliminated the arbitrariness—by defining the crime as “carjacking 
under threat of death or serious bodily injury.” Given the language 
here, I find it much more plausible that congress meant to reach—
as it said—the carjacker who intended to kill. 
Id. at 102 (quoting Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 20 (1999) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). While Justice Scalia may have been responding to the majority’s 
argument, he still spoke in intentionalist terms. Id. at 103. 
183 Id. at 117. It does not seem to worry Solan that some people will not have access 
to legislative history. 
184 Id. 
185 Chapter five begins at page 120. 
186 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 120. 
187 Pursuant to the value of fair notice, judges are uncomfortable effecting the will 
of Congress when a statute is not clear to the ordinary citizen. Id. at 121. This 
concern has led to the doctrines of void for vagueness and the rule of lenity. Id. 
For example, in Wiltberger, the Court held that fair notice and the rule of lenity 
trumped the will of Congress. Id. at 122 (citing United States v. Wiltberger, 18 
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 101 (1820)). 
188 Solan believes that law becomes “more stable over time even if pockets of 
uncertainty and conflict remain.” Id. at 123–24. The principle of stare decisis 
helps judges promote the value of stability, even when their prior interpretation 
appears incorrect with hindsight. Id. at 130. While Solan provides a few 
examples, perhaps the most famous case in exhibiting judicial obstinacy is 
Flood v. Kuhn. Id. at 129. In that case, the Court examined the issue of whether 
baseball should continue to be exempt from federal anti-trust laws. Flood v. 
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 276–77 (1972). In two earlier cases, the Court had held that 
baseball was not an interstate trade or commerce. Fed. Baseball Club of 
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purpose,191 the legislative process,192 coherence,193 constitutional 
stability,194 law enforcement support,195 and political ideology.196 The 
                                                                                                                   
Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 
(1922); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). In 1922, 
the Court may have been correct that baseball did not affect interstate 
commerce, but by 1972, it was clear that baseball did have such an effect. Yet, 
the majority in Flood, while acknowledging that these earlier cases were 
wrongly decided, refused to overturn them. 407 U.S. at 279. The majority 
reasoned that because of the long-standing nature of the opinions, change, if 
any, should be made by Congress. Id. at 283–84. The Court was concerned, in 
part, that baseball had developed during these fifty years under the assumption 
that it was exempt from the anti-trust laws, and to change the rules now would 
be unfair because judicial interpretations of statutes apply retroactively while 
legislative actions usually apply only prospectively. Id. at 275. 
The dissent disagreed, arguing that the earlier cases were wrong and it was time 
to overturn them; “This is a difficult case because we are torn between the 
principle of stare decisis and the knowledge that the decisions in Federal 
Baseball Club . . . and Toolson . . . are totally at odds with more recent and 
better reasoned cases.” Id. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall 
explained: 
We do not lightly overrule our prior constructions of federal 
statutes, but when our errors deny substantial federal rights, like 
the right to compete freely and effectively to the best of one’s 
ability as guaranteed by the antitrust laws, we must admit our error 
and correct it. We have done so before and we should do so again 
here. 
Id. at 292–93. In Justice Marshall’s opinion, it was enough that the prior 
decisions were wrong and that the holdings deprived a litigant of a “substantial 
federal right[].” Id. at 292. His standard for reversing Supreme Court precedent 
is perhaps too light, while the majority’s unwillingness to reexamine and correct 
interpretations that are wrong and at odds with the rest of the Court’s 
jurisprudence also seems wrong. Stare decisis is important for many reasons, but 
it should yield when time proves the earlier decisions to be wrong under modern 
standards. But stare decisis is not an absolute rule. Typically, the Supreme Court 
overrules at least one statutory interpretation case each term. Eskridge et al., 
supra note150, at 281. 
189 Dynamism is the notion that language acquires a new or different meaning with 
time. See SOLAN, supra note 5, at 130–31, 153–54. 
190 Interestingly, remedial statutes are interpreted broadly while criminal statutes 
are generally narrowly interpreted. Id. at 140. Solan posits the question, what if 
a statute is both, such as laws relating to antitrust, copyright, environmental 
laws, securities laws? Id. Solan develops the concept of statutory inflation: when 
one court interprets a statute broadly in a civil context, then a later court adopts 
that broad interpretation in the criminal context. Id. at 141. 
191 As a purposivist, I am surprised that purpose is addressed so briefly. Id. at 142–
46 (addressing purpose as a value). Solan notes that Judge Posner thinks that 
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purposivism is in keeping with legal pragmatism. Id. at 143 (citing RICHARD 
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230–65 (2008)). Legislators should focus on the 
consequences of their decisions rather than be bogged down by formalistic 
considerations, such as minute differences in language. Id. Read literally, a 
statute criminalizing the possession of child pornography would apply to a 
prosecutor and court personnel pursuant. Id. at 143–44. But prosecuting these 
individuals would not further the purpose of the child porn statute. Id. at 144. 
Solan notes that Justice Scalia rarely mentions the purpose of the statute; 
however, dissenters regularly invoke purpose in response to Justice Scalia. Id. at 
144. Solan believes that “[n]otwithstanding the fears Scalia expressed in 
Knudson, such reference to purpose should actually serve to constrain judges.” 
Id. at 145 (citing Great-West Lefe & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 
204, 220 (2002)). In the Knudson case, the conservative Justices were able to 
use vague language to “further an agenda” without even mentioning it: namely 
limiting private lawsuits by civil litigants to enforce rights granted by regulatory 
statutes. Id. at 144–45. “Nonetheless,” Solan concludes: 
when a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, a 
candid debate about what the law was intended to accomplish and 
how to best achieve that result does not appear to be any more of a 
threat to rule-of-law values than pretending that the law is clear 
and avoiding the substantive issues. 
Id. at 146. 
192 Solan says that sometimes the legislature gets the legislative facts wrong and 
then writes a law based on these erroneous findings. Id. at 146. When this 
happens, courts are reluctant to correct such errors because they respect the 
legislative process over fulfilling the law’s intended purpose. Id. Solan 
illustrates this phenomenon in a case where Congress enacted a statute that set 
minimum sentences for the distribution of drugs based on the weight of the 
drugs; however, Congress completely misunderstood that LSD is sold on blotter 
paper, which weighs much more than the drug. Id. at 148 (citing United States v. 
Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990), aff’d sub nom. Chapman v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991)). Judge Posner wanted to correct the statute, but the 
majority led by Judge Easterbrook refused. Id. at 148–49. The statute 
communicated its intent, no error there; rather, the error was in 
misunderstanding the underlying facts (or not knowing them) that led Congress 
to decide on this legislation. Id. at 149. Indeed, the language in the statute was 
very clear. Id. In cases like this, most judges will not “fix” the perceived error; 
courts take seriously the obligation to respect the legislative process, and will 
not put purpose over process in order to fix a poorly drafted law. Id. 
193 Coherence is a surrogate for legislative intent because interpreters assume that 
“legislatures intend to write laws that work in harmony with each other.” Id. at 
149. Solan points to the case of Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co. as an 
example. In Green, Justice Scalia said: 
The meaning of terms on the statute books out to be determined, 
not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been 
understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but 
rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with 
2013 On Reading The Language of Statutes 215 
                                                                                                                   
context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been 
understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the 
statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most 
compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the 
provision must be integrated—a compatibility which, by a benign 
fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind. 
Id. (quoting Green, 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Solan 
adds, “coherence must serve some purpose for it to be justified.” Id. at 150. 
Some interpreters justify coherence as reflecting legislative intent, but Justice 
Scalia disagrees; Scalia justifies the practice as good judicial lawmaking, 
regardless of what the legislature might have intended. Id. (quoting West Va. 
Univ. Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991) (“We do so not because 
that precise accommodative meaning is what the lawmakers must have had in 
mind . . . , but because it is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of 
the corpus juris.”). Solan believes that coherence cannot overcome legislative 
intent, but it can serve as a proxy for intent and a default rule for interpretation. 
Id. at 152. 
194 Solan says that the constitutional avoidance doctrine is often stated in 
intentionalist terms, that Congress would not intend to enact an unconstitutional 
statute. Id. But Solan is a little off on this point. The doctrine is about avoiding 
the constitutional question to begin with, not deciding the issue by picking the 
constitutional interpretation. An example of a constitutional avoidance case is 
N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago Catholic Bishops, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), 
in which the Court ignored the fact that Congress specifically considered an 
amendment to exempt religious schools from the labor laws, but rejected that 
amendment. Id. at 152–53. 
195 Here, Solan says that judges allow words to take on meanings that may have 
differed from when a statute was originally written to help law enforcement 
address obviously bad behavior. Id. at 154. He refers to Moskal v. United States, 
to support his claim. Id. at 153–54 (citing 498 U.S. 103 (1990) (holding that 
“falsely made securities” included documents that were not “counterfeit”)). 
196 Solan says that there is no question that politics influence judicial interpretation. 
Solan, supra note 5, at 155. For example, in a case where a woman employee 
sued her employer because she was paid less than men for same work, and the 
statute required her to file a claim within 180 days of the discriminatory act, the 
employee argued that each paycheck was a discriminatory act while the 
employer argued that only the original employment contract counted. Id. at 155 
(citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)). 
Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion for the conservatives (siding with the 
employer), while Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissenting opinion for liberals. Id. 
at 156. Solan notes that he would have sided with the liberal, dissenting Justices 
because he believes not only that it would better further the legislative will, but 
also because he also would feel good about advancing his own political view 
that it is better for society to have this result. Id. (“doing so helps further values 
that I consider important”). He notes that the conservative Justices would have 
thought that clearly identifying a company’s litigations risks was a fair concern 
and would have felt okay about their choice too. Id. Solan notes that in 2009 
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sheer number of topics might have suggested to the author that more 
time and individual attention would have been appropriate. Instead, 
Solan examines each value to see if it should trump clear text and then 
concludes that while each of these values is important, none should 
surpass clear text or legislative intent because “fidelity to the will of 
the legislature” should control when there is a conflict among any of 
them.197 
F. Who Should Interpret Statutes? 
In the next chapter, chapter six,198 Solan moves away from sources 
of meaning to the appropriate role for interpreters. He notes that 
branches other than the judiciary interpret law.199 Explaining, Solan 
states that: 
All three branches get into the act: the executive, through the 
actions of agencies, prosecutors, and presidential statements; the 
legislature through its enacting laws that tell judges what they must 
consider, what they may consider, and what they may not consider; 
and the judiciary, whose job it has traditionally been to interpret 
statutes.200 
Solan’s conclusion in chapter six is that the judicial branch “should 
remain the principal institution engaged in statutory interpretation[,]” 
and that “[s]tripping judges of the power to make bad decisions almost 
always strips them of the ability to make good ones.”201 
                                                                                                                   
Congress amended the law precisely as the dissenters wanted. Id. Thus, Solan 
suggests that the question is not whether politics play a role, but whether they 
play too much of one. Id. at 157. He cites a study showing that liberals generally 
use the linguistic canons to further liberal results, and conservatives to further 
conservative outcomes; thus, the canons are not neutral. Id. (citing James J. 
Brudney & Corey Ditsler, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Search for 
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 55–56 (2005)). Solan says that there is 
simply no way to remove politics from the decision-making without sacrificing 
our common-law tradition and stability, but he is not concerned because so few 
questions reach the courts and most are decided at the appellate level. Id. at 158. 
For this reason, he believes that the political interference is not so tremendous 
that we should be moved to stop it. Id. Simply put, “Our ability to make laws is 
simply not so crisp as to avoid [politics].” Id. 
197 Id. at 120. 
198 Chapter six begins at page 160. 
199 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 160. 
200 Id. at 195. 
201 Id. at 160–61. 
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Solan addresses the executive first. The executive interprets 
statutes in a number of ways, including through judicial deference to 
agency interpretations and through signing statements.202 Solan 
describes how the executive decided to use signing statements to “shift 
interpretive power” from the judiciary to itself.203 According to Solan, 
Attorney General Edwin Meese suggested to President Reagan that he 
enhance the executive’s influence of statutory interpretation by using 
signing statements.204 Assistant Attorney General Samuel Alito, now 
Justice Alito, authored a memorandum entitled “Using Presidential 
Signing Statement to Make Fuller Use of the President’s 
Constitutionally Assigned Role in the Process of Enacting Law.”205 
Alito argued that, because a bill requires approval by the president and 
each house to become law, “it seems to follow that the President’s 
understanding of the bill should be just as important as that of 
Congress.”206 
In general, Solan has few concerns about signing statements 
because presidents have historically used them to explain how they 
understand the structure of an act and how they would interpret it 
consistently with the U.S. Constitution.207 But he suggests that these 
statements have recently been used to undermine the political 
compromises that were reached during the legislative process.208 For 
example, former President George W. Bush issued a signing statement 
for the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, which outlaws torture.209 Solan 
writes, “[I]n this instance, [President Bush] actually agreed to a 
                                                 
202 Id. at 169. As to deference, Solan claims that “it was the failure to regulate that 
brought down the Bush administration’s efforts and the attempt to regulate too 
aggressively that doomed the Clinton policy” in the area of environmental 
changes. Id. at 164. 
203 Id. at 169. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. (citing Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito Jr., Deputy Assistant Atty. 
Generl, Office of Legal Counsel, to The Litigation Strategy Working Group, 
Using Presidential Signing Statement to Make Fuller Use of the President’s 
Constitutionally Assigned Role in the Process of Enacting Law, 1 (Feb. 5, 
1986), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-
89-269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 170. (“I agree with defenders of signing statements that there is nothing 
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compromise on a bill and then, at least arguably, undermined that 
compromise by disclaiming his obligation to abide by the terms that he 
did not like.”210 When presidents ignore the bargain that was struck, 
they ignore the legislative process leading to that bargain.211 
Regardless, Solan rightly concludes that signing statements rarely 
affect the interpretive process.212 Either a president has the power 
claimed in a signing statement, or not; but simply stating that one has 
the power does not make it so.213 
Another reason signing statements should play no role in 
interpretation is that signing statements are not issued during the 
legislative process; rather, they are issued after it.214 Thus, they are 
similar to post-enactment statements from congress members: largely 
irrelevant.215 When a president issues a statement after the enactment 
process solely to influence interpretation, such a “statement does not 
yield credible evidence of what the law was intended to 
accomplish.”216 Solan suggests that if presidents were to issue 
statements to influence the political bargaining during the legislative 
process, these statements would be more relevant to interpretation.217 
He notes that the president’s power in the legislative bargaining 
process is the veto threat: a president can shape a bill and influence 
bargaining by threatening to veto a bill that is not to his or her 
liking.218 For example, in United States v. Yermian, the Court took 
account of that fact that President Roosevelt vetoed an earlier version 
of the law and “inferred that Congress’s redrafting of the law prior to 
resubmission to the president was intended to reconcile the earlier 
                                                 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 170–71. 
212 Id. at 170–71. Despite the press wringing of hands, the courts have largely 
ignored signing statements. Id. at 171. 
213 Id. at 171. 
214 Id. (“Most importantly, Presidential Signing Statements are issued after a bill is 
signed into law. Therefore, they cannot possibly have influenced the enactment 
process.”). 
215 Id. (describing each as “suffer[ing] from the same problem of timing.”). 
216 Id. at 172. 
217 Id. (“Were presidents to issue their statements in advance as a warning to 
legislators before they cast their final votes, the situation might be entirely 
different.”). 
218 Id. 
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difference and thus construed the statute accordingly.”219 Such pre-
enactment intent is relevant.220 
The executive also influences interpretation in another way: 
agencies interpret the statutes they are charged with administering.221 
Agencies receive varying degrees of deference when they interpret 
statutes.222 Solan groups each of the deference standards into one 
discussion about Chevron deference.223 Here, Solan’s lack of in-depth 
knowledge of administrative law hinders his analysis. Chevron has 
become increasingly complex and muddled over the years.224 As a 
non-administrative law scholar, Solan’s understanding of Chevron is 
undeveloped, and as such his analysis in this section is incomplete.225 
Solan explains why he believes that agencies should have deference 
when they interpret statutes: Chevron fosters the dynamic order by 
making agency interpretations impervious to judicial review and by 
allowing agencies to be more responsive to the nuances of the statutes’ 
domain without fear of court interference.226 Deference also leads to a 
more unified set of regulatory regimes because agencies, rather than a 
patchwork of appellate courts, decide the issues.227 Solan makes the 
incorrect suggestion—which is somewhat fatal to his argument—that 
                                                 
219 Id. (citing generally United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984)). 
220 Id. at 172. 
221 Id. at 161. 
222 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008). 
223 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 161–69 (discussing Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
224 See generally Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on 
the Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141 
(2012) (describing Chevron’s complexity). 
225 For example, he describes Chevron’s first step as follows: “[F]irst, the court 
must decide ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue,’ including an inquiry into whether the congressional delegation to the 
agency is clear and unambiguous.” SOLAN, supra note 5, at 161 (citation 
omitted). But this description conflates two separate inquiries; first, whether 
Congress delegated to the agency at all, and second whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise issue before the court—these are two different 
inquiries. See generally Linda D. Jellum, The United States Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims: Has it Mastered Chevron’s Step Zero?, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 
67 (2011). 
226 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 162. 
227 Id. 
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Chevron allows courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation even 
when the legislative intent suggests that the agency’s choice is not 
what Congress would have wanted.228 Rather, Chevron allows courts 
to defer to an agency’s interpretation even when the agency’s choice is 
not what the Court would have wanted.229 
Solan recounts the research showing that politics influences 
judicial opinions.230 Citing Professors Thomas Miles and Cass 
Sunstein’s famous empirical research showing that conservative 
judges more consistently rule in favor of conservative agency 
decisions while liberal judges more consistently rule in favor of liberal 
                                                 
228 Id. at 166. Chevron’s first step is to determine whether the legislature has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue; legislative intent is relevant at 
this step, and an agency must take that intent into account when formulating its 
interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S. 843 n.9. 
229 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. It is only when Congress has no specific intent that 
the agency can impose its own reasonable interpretation under Chevron’s second 
step. Id. 
230 The case of FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), 
is illustrative. See SOLAN, supra note 5, at 164. In Brown & Williamson, the 
majority rejected the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) decision to 
regulate tobacco. Brown, 529 U.S. at 161. The FDA was authorized to regulate 
“drugs,” “devices,” and “combination products.” 529 U.S. at 126 (citing 21 
U.S.C. § 321(g)–(h) (1994 and Supp. III)). The statute defined these terms as 
“article[s] . . . intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.” Id. 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)). The FDA interpreted this language as allowing it 
to regulate tobacco and cigarettes. Id. at 125. Despite the fact that the language 
of the statute alone was broad enough to support the agency’s interpretation, the 
conservative majority concluded “that Congress ha[d] directly spoken to the 
issue here and precluded the FDA’s jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.” 
Id. at 133. The majority supported its holding by noting that Congress had: (1) 
created a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco products, (2) squarely rejected 
proposals to give the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco, and (3) acted repeatedly to 
preclude other agencies from exercising authority in this area. Id. at 155–56. In 
this case then, the majority held that while Congress may not have spoken to the 
precise issue, it had spoken broadly enough on related questions to prevent the 
agency from acting at all. Id. No deference whatsoever was accorded the 
agency’s interpretation, even though the agency used force-of-law procedures. 
The liberal dissent noted that the language of the statute was clear enough to 
cover cigarettes. Id. at 180–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Solan argues that 
Chevron should have taken this choice away from the court once made by the 
agency. SOLAN, supra note 5, at 169–70. He says that the Court’s liberal Justices 
ignored legislative intent for a wooden application of Chevron while the 
majority’s concerns for legislative intent trumped both Chevron and the text of 
the statute. Id. at 169. The outcome and alignment of the Justices can only be 
explained by politics. Id. 
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agency decisions, Solan concludes that one thing is very clear: 
“[P]olitics matter in predicting whether and when a justice defers to an 
agency interpretation.”231 
The last area in which the executive has power to interpret statutes 
is with prosecutorial discretion.232 Solan suggests that by not 
prosecuting all cases, prosecutors “simulate the rule of lenity.”233 To 
him, this simulation is good because when law officials bring only the 
clear cases to court, there is “less controversy and more respect for 
legal institutions.”234 
Next, Solan moved to legislatures (state and federal) and their 
recent attempts to curtail the judicial interpretation process. This 
subject seems out of place in a chapter about interpreters. In any event, 
in the chapter, Solan borrows heavily from my article, “Which is to be 
Master,” The Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives 
Violate Separation of Powers, to explore the question of whether the 
legislature should tell the judiciary how to interpret laws.235 While 
Professor Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz suggested that the legislature 
                                                 
231 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 167 (citing Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do 
Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 823, 825–26 (2006) (“The most conservative judges are 30 
percentage points more likely to vote to validate agency interpretations that are 
coded as conservative than to validates agency interpretations coded as liberal. 
By contrast, the more liberal Justices are 27 percentage points more likely to 
vote to validate agency interpretations coded as liberal than to validate those 
coded as conservative.”)). 
232 Id. at 173. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. He also mentions that prosecutors sometimes choose not to enforce laws that 
are still on the books but that are no longer relevant, like laws preventing 
sodomy and interracial marriage. Id. at 174. Prosecutorial discretion is good 
when used for good reasons, but sometimes prosecutorial discretion is exercised 
for the wrong reasons. Id. He cites the example of the Government 
Accountability Office’s report accusing the Wage and Hours Division of the 
Department of Labor of not investigating cases regarding unpaid final paychecks 
and of closing these cases with just the employer’s word. Id. (citing U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-973T, DEP’T OF LABOR: CASE STUDIES 
FROM ONGOING WORK SHOW EXAMPLES IN WHICH WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 
DID NOT ADEQUATELY PURSUE LABOR VIOLATIONS (2008)). He believes that 
this type of activity diminishes the rule of law. Id. 
235 Id. at 182 (citing Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the 
Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA 
L. REV. 837 (2009)). 
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should do so in his article, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,236 
I disagreed, arguing that such directives violate separation of 
powers.237 
Solan has a slightly different focus. First, he equates legislative 
attempts to limit judicial review of legislative history with evidentiary 
rules and concludes that because the rules of evidence do not preclude 
much, legislatures should not preclude legislative history.238 This 
argument was a little unclear. Further, Solan thinks legislatures should 
not ban the use of legislative history because it is useful and judges 
know how to use it wisely.239 While he says he is not deciding whether 
such directives would be constitutional,240 he suggests that when a 
legislature in a specific statute tells courts not to consider legislative 
history when interpreting that statute, “it does not usurp the judicial 
function. It merely makes its intent clearer.”241 But, he counters, were 
a legislature to tell courts to never look at legislative history, the 
legislature would intrude on the judicial function.242 
Solan ends this chapter with a section called “Courts Fight 
Back.”243 I enjoyed this section, which identifies the many ways that 
the judiciary has reclaimed some of the interpretive power that the 
other branches have taken.244 Regarding the executive, Solan notes 
that the Supreme Court has retreated from Chevron’s broad deference 
approach and has repossessed some of its interpretive power in this 
area.245 I would go further: the Court’s willingness to defer to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes has vacillated over the last sixty 
years. With this vacillation, the Court dramatically, and likely 
unintentionally, altered executive lawmaking and interpretive power. 
Before Chevron, the executive was an expert advisor, not a lawmaker 
or law interpreter. When the Court decided Chevron, the executive 
                                                 
236 See generally 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002). 
237 Jellum, supra note 235, at 897–98. 
238 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 184. 
239 Id. at 189. 
240 Id. at 188 (“Whether or not [legislatures] can legally [prohibit courts from 
considering legislative history], given constitutional separation of powers, it 
would be a bad idea in any event.”) 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 189. 
244 Id. at 189–95. 
245 Id. at 194–95. 
2013 On Reading The Language of Statutes 223 
moved from expert advisor to quasi-law maker and law interpreter. 
Given that this impact likely was unintended, it might come as no 
surprise that the Court has begun to reclaim this power. With two 
important changes to Chevron’s application— restricting the types of 
agency interpretations entitled to deference and curbing the implied 
delegation rationale—the Court regained some of the interpretive 
power it ceded and re-conveyed some of the lawmaking power it 
shifted with the rise and fall of Chevron.246 
Regarding the legislature, Solan identifies a few ways by which 
courts have curtailed legislative power. First, beginning in the late 
Nineteenth Century, a number of state legislatures, such as New York 
and California, tried to eliminate the rule of lenity by statute to correct 
perceived judicial activism.247 As Solan notes, these statutes have had 
little impact because the rule of lenity respects constitutional fair 
notice.248 Second, just as legislatures write directives for courts to 
follow, the Court has issued directives for Congress to follow, known 
as clear statement rules.249 Pursuant to clear statement rules, if 
Congress wants to alter an important federal right, the Court requires 
Congress to do so clearly.250 One might question whether the Court 
has the power to require clear statements when the U.S. Constitution 
does not require Congress to write laws in this way.251 Indeed, it would 
                                                 
246 See Jellum, supra note 224 (explaining how the Court reclaimed the interpretive 
power it ceded when it decided Chevron). 
247 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 189–91. 
248 Id. at 190. Thus, in Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970), the 
California Supreme Court applied the rule of lenity, despite a statute from 1871 
directing the court not to construe criminal states narrowly, to a case in which 
the defendant kicked his wife in stomach after learning she was pregnant. Id. at 
191 (citing Keeler, 470 P.2d at 623). The court refused to interpret “human 
being” to include fetus. Id. Solan also notes the legislative supremacy is also 
deeply embedded in our system and leads to the rejection of rules eliminating 
the rule of lenity, but this value seems to contradict his conclusion that the 
courts are ignoring the legislative choice to eliminate the rule of lenity. Id. at 
192. 
249 Id. at 193. 
250 For example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court addressed whether a statute 
setting the mandatory retirement for state judges violated the Federal Age 
Discrimination Act. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)).The 
Court rejected the argument and required Congress to provide a clear statement 
if “intends to preempt the historic powers of the states.” Id. 
251 Id. 
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seem that the Court’s requirement sets impermissible conditions on 
Congress’ power to legislate. 
G. Jurors as Statutory Interpreters 
In his next chapter about interpreters, chapter seven,252 Solan 
moves to a discussion of jurors as interpreters and explores the 
question of which legal issues judges should decide and which issues 
should be left to jurors.253 Solan notes that the line between judges and 
juries—judges apply law and jurors find facts, as it is oft articulated—
is simply more blurred than this truism would suggest.254 In truth, this 
chapter added little to my understanding of this topic.255 
H. Legislature, Judges, and Statutory Interpretation 
Solan’s final chapter, chapter eight,256 reads like a conclusion with 
some suggestions. Solan’s conclusions are contained in a numbered 
list.257 These six paragraphs, which are too wordy to repeat here, could 
be a very long thesis. Perhaps, Solan could have provided these 
conclusions at the beginning of his book, which might have offered his 
readers a structure and thesis. Solan argues again that statutory 
interpretation works well most of the time and admits that there are a 
few areas of concern.258 He offers suggestions for how the branches 
could address these concerns,259 which seem unlikely to be 
implemented. 
First, he suggests that federal judges should be more honest and 
less timid about admitting “that they sometimes must exercise 
discretion in deciding a statutory dispute.”260 He offers the case of 
Circuit City Stores v. Adams as an example.261 In that case, the 
                                                 
252 Chapter seven begins at page 196. 
253 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 196. 
254 Id. at 197. 
255 To be honest, I merely skimmed it. But I did learn that the interpretive role of a 
jury initially was much larger because the founders were concerned about 
oppressive laws, and by placing twelve citizens as a buffer between a parliament 
and the justice system, oppression was minimized. Id. at 196. Today, jurors do 
play a smaller role in interpreting statutes. 
256 Chapter eight begins at page 223. 
257 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 223–24. 
258 Id. at 224. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 225. 
261 Id. (citing Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)). 
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Supreme Court decided along political viewpoints that § 1 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act should be narrowly interpreted to apply only to 
transportation workers pursuant to the statutory canon ejusdem 
generis.262 Section 1 excludes “contracts of employment of seamen, 
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign 
or interstate commerce” from the Act’s coverage.263 Solan suggests 
that the conservative Justices should have acknowledged that part of 
their goal has been to move litigation towards arbitration.264 Had they 
done so, the Court could have discussed the relative merits of 
arbitration in a useful and more truthful manner.265 While he admits 
such an approach may look like legislating from the bench, he argues 
that the Justices did so anyway; they just did not admit it.266 He also 
suggests that the more judges simplify statutory language for jurors, 
the more jurors will be unable to implement the legislative will, which 
is important in the criminal context.267 Judges should be more faithful 
to the text, while at the same time maintaining comprehensibility.268 I 
find it highly unlikely that, in this climate against judicial activism, 
judges will heed his suggestion. 
Second, he turns to the legislature and suggests that Congress can 
do more to help judges reach decisions in hard cases.269 Congress 
should provide more information about what it is trying to accomplish 
by including findings, intent, and purpose clauses.270 Solan 
acknowledges that it is often difficult for legislators to agree on a 
statement of purpose after a long, drawn out battle resulting in 
compromise legislation,271 but he suggests that the facts that give rise 
                                                 
262 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114–15. 
263 Id. at 113 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2001)). 
264 SOLAN, supra note 5, at 225 Solan also suggests that the liberal Justices should 
have acknowledged that their goal was to move litigation away from arbitration. 
Id. 
265 Id. at 225. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 226. 
268 Id. Mostly, he wants to comfort judges about the difficulty of their task and let 
them know that legislatures simply cannot make “laws that are at once crisp and 
flexible” due to human’s cognitive capacities. Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 227. 
271 Id. 
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to the legislation may be easier to include.272 Notably, Solan mentions, 
but fails to take into account, the small role that purpose actually plays 
in interpretation even when included within an act.273 
III. CONCLUSION 
At bottom, there are things to both love and hate about Solan’s 
latest text, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES. I believe that Professor 
Solan wants lawyers to understand how our psychological and 
linguistic capabilities affect statutory interpretation; however, the 
linguistic and philosophical discussions are hard to follow for those 
without a background in philosophy or linguistics.274 Also, the text 
lacks a clear organization and identified audience: this is not a book 
for students or lawyers, although I think Professor Solan hoped to 
appeal to the both. Rather, I believe it is a text for those who teach and 
study this subject. 
Despite these weaknesses, this book has nuggets of wisdom for 
those who persevere, most of which I have tried to organize and 
identify above. As someone relatively proficient in this field, I learned 
new things from this text. Indeed, I was in the middle of revising one 
of my own texts on statutory interpretation and incorporated many of 
these ideas. For example, I will be sure to remind my future students 
of Solan’s simple and profound premise that language works most of 
the time and is hard only at the margins. Also, I found instructive his 
description of the ordinary versus the definitional meaning of words. 
In the classroom, I struggle to understand why some students cling so 
perniciously to their dictionaries (or at least their iPhone dictionary 
applications). It makes sense that a search for definitional meaning 
would appeal to those who favor a rulelike approach to interpretation 
                                                 
272 Id. at 229. Courts are somewhat more likely to refer to findings than to purpose 
clauses. Id. at 228. For example, in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565–
66 (1995), the Court encouraged Congress to include them to demonstrate that 
laws enacted pursuant to the commerce clause of the Constitution have a 
sufficient connection to the regulation of interstate commerce to be 
constitutional. Solan says these clauses also help interpretation. SOLAN, supra 
note 5, at 228. 
273 See generally LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 124 
(2008) (describing the role that these clauses play in interpretation and stating 
“generally, the preamble and findings and purpose clauses cannot control clear, 
enacted text”). 
274 And, while I majored in psychology in undergrad, my background there seemed 
to do me no good either. 
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and would be rejected by those favoring a wordlike approach. Further, 
Solan’s explanation of the role of dictionaries offers a compelling 
reason why the dictionary does not provide ordinary meaning in most 
cases. In addition, Solan explains better than any other scholar I have 
read to date how a group can form a unified intent by providing 
examples of groups that can and cannot have such intent. Finally, 
Professor Solan offers a rich panoply of examples for his many 
ideas.275 In the end, I significantly benefitted from reading his text, 
even if I did not always enjoy it. 
                                                 
275 For example, he provides the following absurdity example: no one would arrest 
a prosecutor for having child pornography when the only reason for having the 
contraband was to prosecute someone else. SOLAN, supra note 5, at 3 (citing 
RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 214–15 (2008)). 
